Relevant bibliographies by topics / Principal (in relation to agent)

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Principal (in relation to agent)'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 30 May 2022
Last updated: 31 July 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Principal (in relation to agent)"

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Masse, Claude. "L'abus des fonctions dans la relation préposé-commettant en droit civil québécois." Les Cahiers de droit 19, no. 3 (2005): 595–642. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042259ar.

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The following article deals with the problem of « misuse of office » in the principal-agent relationship under Quebec civil law. Despite the abundance of case law, solutions to the problem are not well defined especially in cases involving personality defects of the agent. The law concerning « misuse of office » is generally to be found in article 1054(7) of the Quebec Civil Code concerning the liability of principals. This controverted article not only deals with the liability of masters for servants, but also with the problem of torts committed by agents (art. 1731 C.C.). It also has an effe
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Petkovšek, Veronika, Nevenka Hrovatin, and Primož Pevcin. "Analysis of principal-agent relationship in Slovenian water and wastewater management." Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 8, no. 6 (2024): 3801. http://dx.doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i6.3801.

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The paper at hand analyses the principal-agent relationship, where comparative perspective between principals’ (municipalities) and agents’ (public utility providers) in the field of water and wastewater management is scrutinized. The goal of the paper is twofold: firstly, to present empirical results validating principal-agent relationships that emerged due to the reorganization process of public enterprises; secondly, to highlight the similarities and differences between the perspectives of principals and agents regarding motives, advantages and disadvantages, and price-setting in relation t
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Hanretty, Chris. "Agents and Patients: The Principal-Agent Perspective." European Political Science 9, no. 4 (2010): 481–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/eps.2010.57.

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Lalević, Nina. "Character of principal: Agent problem in corporate setting." Megatrend revija 20, no. 1 (2023): 197–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/megrev2301197l.

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Problems of conflict, motivation and motive are traditionally studied by social psychology and rational choice theory. One can decide whether to cooperate with others. In other case, person will act independently. When people decide to cooperate, they start a specific social interaction, known as a game. That game is familiar with a phenomenon named principal - agent problem. The core of this problem is linked to gradual drift between motives of principal and agent. Over time, agent will stop working for the principal's interest. Principal and agent roles are found in all systems with hierarch
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Maggetti, Martino, and Yannis Papadopoulos. "The Principal–Agent Framework and Independent Regulatory Agencies." Political Studies Review 16, no. 3 (2016): 172–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929916664359.

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The goal of this contribution is to discuss the application of the principal–agent framework to the study of interactions between elected politicians – the principal – and independent regulatory agencies – the agent. Through a review of recent research we suggest that the principal–agent framework, despite its parsimony and analytical leverage, requires considerable refinement to make sense of these relations. Indeed, evidence on the functioning of independent regulatory agencies shows that some of their key practices tend to deviate from expectations based on the principal–agent framework. Fi
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Worsham, Jeff, and Jay Gatrell. "Multiple Principals, Multiple Signals: A Signaling Approach to Principal-Agent Relations." Policy Studies Journal 33, no. 3 (2005): 363–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2005.00120.x.

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Salim, Sandra, Jessica Lioe, Sandy Harianto, and Yang Elvi Adelina. "The Impact of Corporate Governance Quality on Principal-Agent and Principal-Principal Conflict in Indonesia." Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan 24, no. 2 (2022): 91–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.9744/jak.24.2.91-105.

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This study analyzes the effect of corporate governance (CG) quality on principal-agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP) conflict in Indonesia while also controlling for potential endogeneity through the use of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The results for PA conflict (measured by operating expense ratio and asset utilization ratio) are consistent with the notion that better CG quality leads to a lower level of PA conflict. However, the result for PP conflict is inconclusive. While a higher CG quality is positively related to a higher dividend payout ratio, which indicates a lower
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CARRUBBA, CLIFFORD J., and TOM S. CLARK. "Rule Creation in a Political Hierarchy." American Political Science Review 106, no. 3 (2012): 622–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305541200024x.

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Principal-agent relations are replete in politics; politicians are agents of electorates, bureaucrats are agents of executives, lower courts are agents of upper courts, and much more. Commonly, principals are modeled as the rule-making body and agents as the rule-implementing body. However, principals often delegate the authority to make the rules themselves to their agents. The relationship between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court is one such example; a considerable portion of the law (rules) is made in the lower federal courts with the Supreme Court serving primarily as the ove
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Fahmi, Ujang, Canggih Puspo Puspo Wibowo, and Faturahman Yudanto Yudanto. "Mapping The Principal-Agent Relation In Social Media: A Data Mining Approach." Jurnal Administrasi dan Kebijakan Publik 3, no. 2 (2019): 158–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/jakp.3.2.158-178.2018.

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Most of the research on social media is conducted to comprehend and to exploit the presence of public opinion in it. Meanwhile, there has been limited research that explores the engagement process and interaction results from social media accounts. Therefore, this study aims to map the interaction between government and society in social media in principal-agent context. Exploration made from tweets posted by @KemenDesa and citizens' tweets which are mentioning @KemenDesa dated from 1 October 2014 to 31 September 2017. The results give an idea of the engagement process and the content of the i
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Jaeckel, Johann K. "Inside the Capitalist Firm: An Evolutionary Theory of the Principal-Agent Relation." Review of Political Economy 27, no. 2 (2015): 240–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2015.1010741.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Principal (in relation to agent)"

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Dunn, Malcolm. "Inside the capitalist firm : an evolutionary theory of the principal agent-relation." Universität Potsdam, 2013. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2013/6515/.

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This book deals with the inner life of the capitalist firm. There we find numerous conflicts, the most important of which concerns the individual employment relationship which is understood as a principal-agent problem between the manager, the principal, who issues orders that are to be followed by the employee, the agent. Whereas economic theory traditionally analyses this relationship from a (normative) perspective of the firm in order to support the manager in finding ways to influence the behavior of the employees, such that the latter – ideally – act on behalf of their superior, this book
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Kearney, Linwood Waitus. "Impression management in the principal-agent relation an experimental examination of productivity and planning benefits /." Tallahassee, Florida : Florida State University, 2009. http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-11132009-101744/.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2009.<br>Advisor: Douglas E. Stevens, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Accounting. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed on April 28, 2010). Document formatted into pages; contains x, 89 pages. Includes bibliographical references.
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Andersson, Jens, Olle Karlsson, and Mattias Pettersson. "Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv." Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-21661.

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Titel: Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv Universitet: Malmö Universitet Kurs: TR128C – Företagsekonomi: Examensarbete i Transport Management Författare: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Handledare: Benedikte Borgström Nyckelord: Agentteori, agentproblem, måldivergens, informationsasymmetri, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmerbarhet Syfte: Att utifrån ett principal-agent-perspektiv studera hur relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare i den studerade miljön påverkas av förekomsten av informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder, s
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Doss, Ryan Garrett. "Principal-agent alignment and relational incentive contracts in high-performance service operations." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/90776.

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Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2014. In conjunction with the Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT.<br>Thesis: M.B.A., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2014. In conjunction with the Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 126-127).<br>This thesis focuses on the creation of a high-performance service operations organization. As organizations increasingly compete on service quality, increased attent
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Rieke-Smith, Susan. "Principal-Agent Relations in Oregon Education Policymaking: The Case of Full-Day Kindergarten." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19334.

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The exercise of federal and/or state power is inherent to policymaking. The principal-agent theory, borrowed from economics, describes the difficulties in motivating one party (agent) to act in the best interests of the other party (principal). The theory provides insights into the roles of self-interested choice, information asymmetry, and sense making in political relationships. The extent to which the state understands the inherent challenges expressed in this dynamic and is responsive to the local school district’s specific circumstances is not well understood and thus presents an opport
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Johnson, Oliver W. "The evolution of donor-recipient relations in electricity reform : rethinking the principal-agent framework." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2011. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/6974/.

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Since the early 1990s electricity reforms across Sub-Saharan Africa have been marked by controversy. Despite the World Bank's major role in driving electricity reform as part of its conditional lending strategy in the electricity sector, its relationship with recipient countries has received little attention within the electricity reform literature. This is surprising given the increasing pressure on the World Bank to improve the effectiveness of its conditional lending more generally. This thesis contributes to filling this gap by exploring how World Bank-recipient country relations shape and
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Kleine, Fabian [Verfasser], Manfred [Akademischer Betreuer] Königstein, and Robert [Akademischer Betreuer] Jung. "Asymmetry, Heterogeneity and Endogeneity in Principal Agent Relations / Fabian Kleine. Gutachter: Manfred Königstein ; Robert Jung." Erfurt : Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, 2013. http://d-nb.info/104585915X/34.

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Kleine, Fabian Verfasser], Manfred [Akademischer Betreuer] [Königstein, and Robert [Akademischer Betreuer] Jung. "Asymmetry, Heterogeneity and Endogeneity in Principal Agent Relations / Fabian Kleine. Gutachter: Manfred Königstein ; Robert Jung." Erfurt : Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, 2013. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201300599.

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Egger, Clara. "ONG : Organisations néo-gouvernementales : analyse des stratégies étatiques de contrôle des ONG humanitaires en zone de conflit : (1989-2005)." Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016GREAH032.

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Cette thèse porte sur le contrôle que les Etats exercent sur les ONG humanitaires. Ces dernièresconservent parfois une grande marge de manoeuvre dans la mise en oeuvre de leur mandat, alorsque, dans d'autres circonstances, elles agissent en sous-contractants de la politique étrangère deleur État d'origine. Nous cherchons à identifier les facteurs qui mènent les ONG plutôt dans unedirection que dans l’autre, ainsi que la modalité de contrôle exercée par les États – coordinationou blanchiment - La thèse explique pourquoi, au sortir de la guerre froide, les Etats ont accru leurengagement dans l’a
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Michalowitz, Irina. "Strategies of euro-lobbying : principal, agent and target relations influencing european policy outcomes for IT and transport." Université Robert Schuman (Strasbourg) (1971-2008), 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002STR30019.

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Comment peut-on moduler les relations de l' " Euro-lobbying ", et quelles sont les possibilités de concevoir un modèle fondé sur l'interprétation de telles relations? Cette question et paradoxe de recherche entre des chercheurs à tendance économique et ceux à tendance empirique et sociologiste est adressée dans cette thèse, d'une manière empirique avec 106 entretiens qualitatifs et une enquête dans les secteurs transport et NTI. La recherche est fondée sur un approche d'échange et de principal-agent. Elle montre que le lobbying européen se situe dans des structures spécifiques, avec des interd
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Books on the topic "Principal (in relation to agent)"

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Malcomson, James M. The multiperiod principal agent problem. Department of Economics, University of Southampton, 1985.

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Jewitt, Ian. Information in principal agent problems. University of Bristol, Department of Economics, 1996.

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Zou, Liang. Essays in principal-agent theory. CIACO, 1989.

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Kleine, Andreas. Entscheidungstheoretische Aspekte der Principal-Agent-Theorie. Physica-Verlag HD, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-52416-5.

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Grünbichler, Andreas. Betriebliche Altersvorsorge als Principal-Agent-Problem. Gabler Verlag, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-87977-6.

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Grünbichler, Andreas. Betriebliche Altersvorsorge als Principal-Agent-Problem. Gabler, 1991.

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Kiener, Stefan. Die Principal-Agent-Theorie aus informationsökonomischer Sicht. Physica-Verlag HD, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-11526-8.

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Goudriaan, René. A principal-agent model of conditional grants. Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1990.

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Rey, Patrick. Vertical restraints from a principal-agent viewpoint. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1985.

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Delreux, Tom, and Johan Adriaensen, eds. The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1.

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Book chapters on the topic "Principal (in relation to agent)"

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Drieskens, Edith, and Yf Reykers. "The Principal–Agent Model and Inter-Organizational Relations." In Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36039-7_12.

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Xie, Huo-bao, and Chun-yan Chen. "Enterprise Compensation Incentive Theory on Principle-Agent Relation." In The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_72.

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Bernard, Georges. "Relations between Agents." In Principia Economica. Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0935-9_13.

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Bernard, Georges. "Relations between Agents. Activity." In Principia Economica. Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0935-9_4.

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Bardolet, David. "Principal Agent." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_222.

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Bardolet, David. "Principal Agent." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_222-1.

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Cvitanić, Jakša, and Jianfeng Zhang. "Principal–Agent Problem." In Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14200-0_1.

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Schneeweiss, Christoph. "Principal Agent Theory." In Distributed Decision Making. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24724-1_5.

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Spremann, Klaus. "Agent and Principal." In Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_2.

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Reisman, David. "Principal and Agent." In Market and Health. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22958-1_2.

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Conference papers on the topic "Principal (in relation to agent)"

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Xu, Ting, Haiqin Yang, Fei Zhao, Zhen Wu, and Xinyu Dai. "A Two-Agent Game for Zero-shot Relation Triplet Extraction." In Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics ACL 2024. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.18653/v1/2024.findings-acl.446.

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Yang, Guang, Vikram Kapila, and Ravi Vaidyanathan. "A Dynamic-Programming-Styled Algorithm for a Class of Multi-Agent Optimal Task Assignment." In ASME 2001 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2001/dsc-24536.

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Abstract In this paper, we use a dynamic programming formulation to address a class of multi-agent task assignment problems that arise in the study of fuel optimal control of multiple agents. The fuel optimal multi-agent control is highly relevant to multiple spacecraft formation reconfiguration, an area of intense current research activity. Based on the recurrence relation derived from the celebrated principle of optimality, we develop an algorithm with a distributed computational architecture for the global optimal task assignment. In addition, we propose a communication protocol to facilita
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Espach, Jonathan, and Michiel Bekker. "THE IMPACT OF THE RELATIONAL CHARTER ON THE PROJECT PRINCIPAL–AGENT RELATIONSHIP." In 10th IPMA Research conference: Value co-creation in the project society. International Project Management Association, Serbian Project Management Association, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.56889/qoas9642.

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This paper aims to identify variables that define the agency relationship and the relational charter, and the likelihood of the relational charter affecting the agency relationship. However, the link between the two constructs remains unclear. The results from the literature identified the variables that define the agency relationship and the relational charter. Results from a survey of 93 South African project engineers and project managers to demonstrate the impact of the relational charter on the agency relationship. As opposed to literature this research found that the relational charter d
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Tudor, Andreea-Loredana. "EUROPEAN PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PARADIGM. SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATION OR DELEGATED INSTITUTION?" In 9th SWS International Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES - ISCSS 2022. SGEM WORLD SCIENCE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35603/sws.iscss.2022/s01.004.

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The European Public Prosecutor's Office, a revolutionary novelty, has raised many issues and questions from the initial moment of the proposal of its creation in 2013 until now. Being a rather controversial topic, both among practitioners and theorists, the European Public Prosecutor's Office presents itself as an "unidentified flying object" among the European or national institutions of the EU Member States regarding the nature of this body, the way it works, the way of influencing the political decision and its competence, the corresponding policy, and the guiding governance, etc. Preventin
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Yang, Shu-jun, and Chun-lei Wu. "Cooperation and competition between owner and manager: A research framework of two-way principal-agent relations." In 2012 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2012.6414240.

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Jašurek, Igor. "INFORMATION AND CONSULTANCY CENTRES IN SLOVAKIA – PROMOTING PARTNERSHIP IN COHESION POLICY." In Sixth International Scientific-Business Conference LIMEN Leadership, Innovation, Management and Economics: Integrated Politics of Research. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/limen.2020.141.

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Implementation of cohesion policy, as the major EU budgetary chapter, is subject to vast scholarship. Therefore, surprisingly enough, the principal-agent (P-A) framework has received little recognition in this academic field so far. The present paper contributes to the expansion of this increasingly popular approach also into cohesion scholarship by examining the operation of Information and Consultancy Centres (ICC) in Slovakia. The major finding shows limits of the P-A framework by suggesting that instead of a mutual conflict, it is a cooperative mode dominantly shaping dynamics of P-A relat
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Xu-bo Zhang, Zi-gang Zhang, and Zi-lin Chen. "A principal-agent problem." In 2007 IEEE International Conference on Grey Systems and Intelligent Services. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/gsis.2007.4443481.

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Lavi, Ron, and Elisheva S. Shamash. "Principal-Agent VCG Contracts." In EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329570.

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Hyland, David, Julian Gutierrez, and Michael Wooldridge. "Principal-Agent Boolean Games." In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/17.

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We introduce and study a computational version of the principal-agent problem -- a classic problem in Economics that arises when a principal desires to contract an agent to carry out some task, but has incomplete information about the agent or their subsequent actions. The key challenge in this setting is for the principal to design a contract for the agent such that the agent's preferences are then aligned with those of the principal. We study this problem using a variation of Boolean games, where multiple players each choose valuations for Boolean variables under their control, seeking the s
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"Study on Principal-agent Theory." In 2019 Scientific Conference on Management, Education and Psychology. The Academy of Engineering and Education (AEE), 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.35532/jsss.v1.015.

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Reports on the topic "Principal (in relation to agent)"

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Antic, Nemanj, Ameet Morjaria, and Miguel Ángel Talamas Marcos. Preliminary Findings: Task Clarity and Credibility in Relational Contracts. Inter-American Development Bank, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013146.

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We develop and test a relational contracting model where building relationships requires the principal and agent to solve task clarity and credibility problems. We model task clarity as the likelihood of the agent finding a productive action for the principal and demonstrate that it influences the agents propensity to fulfill promises the usual notion of credibility in relational contracts. This is because improving task clarity increases the ease of replacing a relationship after a defection, making defection more tempting. We validate our model using a decade of administrative data from the
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Moore, Mark, and Marla Spivack. A Public Value Approach to Analyzing and Intervening in National Educational Systems. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-misc_2023/10.

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Any analysis of a “National Educational System” reveals a highly complex social production system that is neither a hierarchical organization, nor a market, nor simply a misaligned system of principals and agents. It is, instead, a complex array of social actors bound together through various social structures and processes on one hand, and important functional relationships on the other. In approaching the challenge of moving that system towards sustained productivity gains, national governments naturally fall prey to the assumption that, in the principal/agent framework they are the principa
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Chassang, Sylvain, Gerard Padro Miquel, and Erik Snowberg. Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16343.

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Gómez-González, Esteban, Andrés Murcia, and Nancy Eugenia Zamudio-Gómez. Foreign debt flows and domestic credit : a principal-agent approach. Banco de la República, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/tef.75.

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Murtishaw, Scott, and Jayant Sathaye. Quantifying the Effect of the Principal-Agent Problem on USResidential Energy Use. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/913156.

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Kim, Anya, and Ira S. Moskowitz. Incentivized Cloud Computing: A Principal Agent Solution to the Cloud Computing Dilemma. Defense Technical Information Center, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada530441.

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Borenstein, Severin, Meghan Busse, and Ryan Kellogg. Principal-agent Incentives, Excess Caution, and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13679.

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Gates, Daniel R., E. C. Yoder, and Peter J. Coughlan. Combating Principal-Agent Relationship Problems: Use of the Truth Revealing Incentive Mechanism. Defense Technical Information Center, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada475993.

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Julio-Román, Juan Manuel. Principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance: the case of mandatory individual pension accounts. Banco de la República, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/be.546.

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10

Greenstone, Michael, Guojun He, Ruixue Jia, and Tong Liu. Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China’s War on Air Pollution. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27502.

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